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ABSTRACT
The task of this article is to outline foundations of a Marxist-humanist 
approach to communication justice, media justice, and digital justice. 
A dialectical approach to justice is outlined that differs from idealist monism, 
dualism, and pluralism. It conceives of injustice as alienation and inhumanity 
and justice as humanism. This approach is applied to communication, media, 
and the digital. The article outlines concepts and dimensions of (in)justice in 
general, communication (in)justice, media (in)justice, and digital (in)justice.
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On 3 February 2019, Donald Trump tweeted: “With Caravans marching through Mexico and toward 
our Country, Republicans must be prepared to do whatever is necessary for STRONG Border Security. 
Dems do nothing. If there is no Wall, there is no Security. Human Trafficking, Drugs and Criminals of 
all dimensions – KEEP OUT!”1 This tweet characterizes immigrants from the South as traffickers, drug 
dealers, and criminals. It makes the sweeping generalization that immigrants are criminals. Many 
observers will agree that such a tweet is the communication of ideology and of a particular form of 
injustice, namely the reduction of fleeing humans to criminality. The tweet denies immigrants their 
humanity. There is a connection of inhumanity and injustice. And in an information society, this 
connection is frequently communicated in public via the media and the Internet. But what is media/ 
communication (in)justice? And how can we theorize media/communication (in)justice? This article 
is a contribution to the analysis of the media/communication and (in)justice.
Engaging with philosophical approaches to communication, Peters (1999, p. 269) concludes that 
communication is “a political and ethical problem” and that “just communication is an index of the 
good society.” The analysis of communication and society brings up the question of what just 
communication is and how it should be defined. This article is a contribution to the theoretical debate 
on media and justice (see also, among others, Christians, Glasser, McQuail, Nordenstreng, & White, 
2009; Couldry, 2012; Habermas, 1990; Jansen, Pooley, & Taub-Pervizpour, 2011; Jensen, 2021; 
Padovani & Calabrese, 2014; Rao & Wasserman, 2015; Silverstone, 2007; Taylor, 2017).
Frey, Pearce, Pollock, Artz, and Murphy (1996, p. 113) document that until 1996, the journal Social 
Justice Research contained “not a single article written by communication scholars or about commu-
nication behavior.” The Philosophical Review, founded in 1892, published between 1970 and 2020 only 
seven articles containing the keyword “communication” in the title. The Journal of Political Philosophy 
during the same period just published one article containing “communication” in its title. There is 
little interest in communication in the field of philosophy. Vice versa, there is also little interest in 
justice in media and communication studies: Between 1970 and 2020, Journal of Communication only 
published nine articles containing the title keyword “justice.” In Communication Theory, the amount 
was two articles. There has thus far been little explicit intersection between ethics/philosophy and 
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communication studies when it comes to the issue of what justice means. This article contributes to 
the intersection of philosophy and media/communication studies for the analysis of (in)justice. It is 
based on a Marxist-humanist ethics.
In many discussions of ethics, Marxism is either dismissed or not mentioned at all. Marxist theory 
has something important to add. Unfortunately it is often not acknowledged as a viable approach to 
ethics. For example, widely read and cited introductions to ethics and moral philosophy such as 
McNaughton’s (1988) Moral Vision: An Introduction to Ethics do not at all mention Marx and Marx- 
inspired approaches (such as the ones by Theodor W. Adorno, Paul Blackledge, Gerald A. Cohen, 
Erich Fromm, Norman Geras, Peter Hudis, Eugene Kamenka, Steven Lukes, [the early, Marxist- 
humanist works of] Alasdair MacIntyre, George E. McCarthy, Richard W. Miller, Sean Sayers, Michael 
J. Thompson). The presentation of approaches to ethics is often limited to the discussion of virtue 
ethics, deontology, and consequentialism (e.g., Fieser, 2005).
Also in media ethics and digital ethics, introductions often tend to ignore Marx and the tradition 
built on his works (e.g., Christians, Fackler, Richardson, Kreshel, & Woods, 2017; Floridi, 2010, 2013; 
Patterson, Wilkins, & Painter, 2019; Ward & Wasserman, 2010). My own approach to ethics and 
critical theory combines, among others, Aristotle’s virtue ethics and Marx’s critical ethics (Fuchs, 
2020a). Whereas many Marxists often engage with a variety of non-Marxian approaches, the same 
cannot be said of many non-Marxian approaches. My point is that Marxian ethics is a legitimate 
approach that should be more acknowledged in ethics in general as well as in media ethics.
Theories of justice
Morality is about principles of how to attain the good life and what the difference is between the good and the 
bad. Ethics is moral philosophy, the systematic theoretical study of morality and morals in society. Justice is 
one of the key categories in morality and ethics. It has been “a central concern of philosophy from the time of 
Plato [. . .] until today” (Rainbolt, 2013, p. 1). We can distinguish four types of theories of justice (Table 1): 
idealist monism; dualism; pluralism; and dialectics. The typology is based on logical principles of how to 
relate two categories: the one and the other. Monism identifies one overarching foundational principle from 
which others are derived. Dualism identifies two equally foundational, independent substances. Pluralism 
combines many dualisms so that there are multiple, diverse, independent categories or principles. It is 
a special form of dualism. Dialectics is a dialectic of identity and non-identity of the one and the many. There 
is a unifying principle identical to all aspects and there are interacting, encroaching, intersecting, diverse 
moments that have common as well as different aspects.
Idealist justice monism reduces justice to the level of political or cultural justice as key principle. 
Justice dualism identifies two equally important, independent principles of justice. Justice pluralism is 
a more complex form of dualism, a combination of several dualisms. It identifies multiple, indepen-
dent principles of justice. Justice dialectics is based on a unified principle of justice that grounds 
diverse principles of justice. It is a unity in the diversity of justice that identifies a general principle and 
grounding of justice and diverse forms of justice that interact and are based on the unifying principle. 
It is at the same time monist and pluralist.
Idealist-monist theories of justice
John Rawls’s (1999) book A Theory of Justice that was first published in 1971 is one of the most cited 
philosophy books published in the 20th century. In the year 2020, this work had around 90,000 
citations.2 It advances a political monist theory of justice. It is idealist because its ultimate principle of 
justice focuses on the realm of politics and political liberties and downplays the importance of the 
economy. It takes on the form of the greatest equality principle that says that all humans have “an equal 
2Data source: https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cites=5140131155315206711&as_sdt=2005&sciodt=0,5&hl=en, accessed on 
1 September 2020.
2 C. FUCHS
right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties” (Rawls, 1999, p. 266). Rawls gives 
priority to political justice over socio-economic justice. He argues that the liberal rights that for him 
make up the constitutional essentials are “more urgent to settle” (Rawls, 2001, p. 49) than social 
problems. Rawls (1999, pp. 266–267; 2001, pp. 42–43) considers social and economic inequalities as 
justified as long as the greatest possible benefit is achieved for the least advantaged (difference 
principle) and offices and positions deciding over questions of distribution are open to all (equal 
opportunity principle).
Rawls’s theory has been criticized for legitimating class inequality (Cohen, 2008; Miller, 1975). He 
characterizes liberal rights also as “background justice” (Rawls, 2001, p. 50), which implies a priority of 
political over socio-economic rights. Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights defines the right 
to social security (§22), Rawls basically says that freedom of speech is more important than the right to eat, the 
right to housing, the right to health, the right to social security, and the right to lead a good life. According to 
Marxist criticism, Rawls’s concept of justice sees it as legitimate that citizens starve as long as they have 
freedom of speech. Many capitalists will not commit to the difference principle when it implies they have to 
reduce their profits. They will argue that social policy measures such as higher corporation taxes or the 
reduction of the working day with full wage compensation destroy their companies and result in unemploy-
ment (Miller, 1975, p. 210). The capitalist ruling class has political and ideological institutions at hand that 
“work exclusively or almost exclusively in its interests” (Miller, 1975, p. 227). It does not voluntarily accept the 
creation of social equality (Cohen, 2008, p. 290).
Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition is a cultural monist theory of justice (see Table 2). Honneth 
(2007, 2008) reinterprets Lukács’ concept of reification as disrespect. He says that reification is 
society’s disrespect for certain groups and individuals. Disrespect is a lack of recognition for certain 
human beings in society. Honneth identifies love, equality, and achievement as three forms of respect. 
For Hegel, these are the recognition of the need for love provided in the family, the recognition of 
human autonomy in civil society and the legal system, and the recognition of individual particularity 
by the state and in ethical life and processes of solidarity (Honneth, 1996, p. 25). The absence of such 
forms or recognition would be the foundation of struggles for recognition. For Honneth, 
a reconstructive theory of justice needs three normative principles: justice of needs, deliberative 
equality, and justice of achievement (Honneth, 2014, p. 49).
Honneth does not properly take into account the roles of work, the economy, and use-values in 
society. The economy seems to simply be another solidarity community providing a particular form of 
esteem and achievement. The ideal-type economy is about a specific aspect of free human self- 
realization through work. In what Marx terms the realm of freedom, work is a source of pleasure, 
need satisfaction, communication, and care for others. Work is more than a source of achievement. 
Whereas in The Struggle for Recognition, Honneth (1996) tends to ignore the economy, in The I in We 
(Honneth, 2014) he subsumes it into the third realm. This means, however, that he reduces the 
economy and work to recognition. The satisfaction of human needs through social production is 
primarily a matter of survival and pleasure that cannot be reduced to culture and recognition. 
Honneth’s approach is a “‘moral’ monism” (Fraser & Honneth, 2003, p. 254), where recognition is 
the unifying principle of morality and society
Dualist theories of justice
Dualist approaches to justice consider one overarching principle of justice as insufficient and therefore 
postulate two principles operating in two relatively independent realms of society. Nancy Fraser (1995, 
1997) advances a dualist theory of justice (see Young, 1997), where the starting point is that “justice 
today requires both redistribution and recognition” (Fraser, 1995, p. 69). She considers redistribution 
and recognition, political economy and culture/identity, as two relatively distinct and equally impor-
tant realms of society. She discerns between economic and cultural injustices. But in reality, all culture 
is economic in that it is a realm of the production of meaning (that in contemporary capitalism is often 
mediated by capital and commodities as the existence of cultural commodities shows) and all economy 
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is cultural because workers have particular working cultures, companies have philosophies, there are 
corporate ideologies such as neoliberalism, etc. For Fraser, exploitation, economic marginalization, 
and deprivation are types of economic injustice, whereas cultural domination, nonrecognition, and 
disrespect are forms of cultural injustice. Although Fraser acknowledges articulation and interaction, 
the economy and culture, economic and cultural injustice, and redistribution and recognition are 
conceptually separate.
In her approach formulated in the 1990s, Fraser held such a two-dimensional concept of justice focused 
on the economy (distribution) and culture (recognition). Later, she added the concept of political justice 
(Fraser, 2009) and developed her approach into a pluralistic theory of justice. (see Table 3).
Fraser sees the economy, culture and politics as three equally important and relatively independent 
domains of society. She argues for a perspectival dualism where the two realms are impinging on each 
other (Fraser & Honneth, 2003, p. 64). We can characterize Fraser’s theory as interactive dualism. For 
her, the two levels of are autonomous and interact in certain cases. Fraser rejects the assumption of 
a universal normative principle of justice. Recognition, distributive justice, and representation/parti-
cipation are for her “multiple points of entry into social reality” (Fraser & Honneth, 2003, p. 205). The 
problem with such an approach is that it establishes a plurality without unity.
Pluralist theories of justice
The capabilities approach of Amartya Sen (2009) and Martha Nussbaum (2011) is one of the most 
influential pluralistic theories of justice. Capabilities are about human functioning, being, and doing. In 
the capabilities approach, justice has to do with the distribution of opportunities for realizing 
capabilities and can be advanced through institutional changes. Nussbaum (2011, 33–34) identifies 
ten central capabilities: life, bodily health, bodily integrity, senses/imagination/thought, emotions, 
practical reason, affiliation, concern for other species, play, control over one’s political and material 
environment. The capabilities approach identifies a plurality of human needs, but it remains unclear 
what unifies and connects human needs. Iris Marion Young (1990) is another representative of 
a pluralistic theory of justice. Her theory of (in)justice’s key category is oppression. She distinguishes 
between five forms of oppression that she terms the five faces of oppression (see Table 4).
Young rejects the assumption of a human nature and essence: “Although social processes of affinity 
and differentiation produce groups, they do not give groups a substantive essence. There is no 
common nature that members of a group share. As aspects of a process, moreover, groups are fluid; 
they come into being and may fade away” (Young, 1990, p. 47). The assumption that there are no 
common features of humans results in incoherent social theory. Humans share capacities such as 
social production, social and societal relations, self-consciousness, moral reasoning and action, 
anticipatory thinking, creative action, communication, and co-operation.
A consistent typology has to be complete and its categories have to be non-overlapping. Young’s 
concepts of marginalization and powerlessness are closely related. For her, powerlessness seems to be 
marginalization in the context of decision-making. But such an assumption results in quite narrow 
concepts of power, empowerment, disempowerment, powerfulness, and powerlessness that are limited 
to the political dimension of society. Power is the capacity of humans to influence and control their 
lives and its various dimensions. There is economic, political, and cultural power. Powerlessness is not 
Table 1. A typology of theories of justice.
Logical principle Theory of justice





limited to decision-making but can also take on the form of poverty, voicelessness, invisibility, etc. In 
disempowerment, humans are robbed of the control of the conditions of their lives. Alienation is the 
state that results from such disempowerment. Empowerment is the tendency to overcome alienation.
Exclusion and marginalization are aspects of domination. Domination is defined as the process 
where one group in society arrives at benefits at the expense of others. The dominating group has 
advantages and excludes others from such advantages. And it has means at its disposal to defend its 
privileged position and to keep others disadvantaged. Exclusion is a process through which domina-
tion operates. Marginalization is the result of domination: one group has disadvantages, while another 
one benefits. Domination operates through a variety of processes and structures, including exclusion, 
the state, the law, surveillance, violence, warfare, and rules.
Cultural imperialism is one form of disrespect in society. Making other humans, their voices and 
bodies, invisible through asymmetric power of attention and visibility is one form of disrespect. 
Scapegoating certain groups is another one. Scapegoating is part of ideology. Ideology is a means and 
process through which one group portrays society or certain aspects of it (such as certain groups or 
individuals) in a false or distorted manner in order to legitimate and upholds its power and interests. 
Cultural imperialism is the privileging of the reputation, visibility, and way of life of one group at the 
expense of others. It is a unity without diversity that disrespects certain identities and ways of life. But 
there is also another form of disrespect, namely diversity without unity, where humans ignore each 
other and see each other as having nothing in common. Diversity without unity is the imperialism of 
difference and partiality that ignores commonality and universality. Unity without diversity and 
diversity without unity are two cultural processes that constitute disrespect. Disrespect is practiced 
through ideology, by denying other human beings’ relevance, or by denying the cultural commons – 
i.e., common aspects of human life. Young disregards the complexity of disrespect, especially the 
oppression caused by difference without unity.
Table 2. Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition.
Form of justice Type of recognition Institutions
justice of needs Love Family, friendships
deliberative equality Equality civil society, legal system
justice of achievement achievement, esteem solidarity communities of value
Table 3. Nancy Fraser’s theory of justice.
Realm of society Form of justice Form of injustice
Economy distributive justice maldistribution
Culture Recognition malrecognition
Politics political justice, participatory democracy misrepresentation
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Violence is the intentionally caused harm of a human being (Walby, 2020). Violence turns the 
human being “into a thing in the most literal sense: it makes a corpse out of him” (Weil, 2005, p. 183). 
Violence is not the same as power. It is a dimension of coercive societies and a social relation, where 
humans try to intentionally cause physical harms to other humans who don’t agree to the cause of that 
harm (see Walby, 2020 for a detailed discussion). The harm caused is usually “a physical injury” 
(Walby et al., 2017, p. 33), but can also in addition involve mental or psychological harm. Physically 
injuring others can take on a variety of forms such as assault, torture, rape, killing, murder, war, 
genocide, enslavement, etc. Violence is a means toward an end such as gaining control of resources 
(e.g. land, humans), exterminating certain humans – i.e., the absolute exclusion from society through 
death, gaining pleasure or reputation, etc. Violence is a means for creating alienation, but it is not in 
itself an alienated system or condition as Young’s typology implies.
Intersectional theories are pluralistic theories of justice. Patricia Hill Collins (2000, 299) defines 
intersectionality as matrix of domination, whereby she understands “the overall organization of 
hierarchical power relations for any society. Any specific matrix of domination has (1) a particular 
arrangement of intersecting systems of oppression, e.g., race, social class, gender, sexuality, citizen-
ship status, ethnicity and age; and (2) a particular organization of its domains of power, e.g., 
structural, disciplinary, hegemonic, and interpersonal.” Figure 1 visualizes the matrix of domination. 
It identifies nine plural levels of human identity that are sources of domination. These realms are 
articulated, but independent.
The problem of pluralistic theories of justice is that they consider society as consisting of indepen-
dent spheres. Forms of (in)justice are articulated but it remains unclear why there is a particular 

































Figure 1. The matrix of domination in intersectional theories (based on Adams & Zúñiga, 2016, p. 162).
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which makes the resulting typologies inconsistent. Eve Mitchell (2013) argues that intersectional 
theories only stress the difference of identities and lack a focus on the common features of humans 
and a focus on humanity as the common aspect. According to Mitchell, intersectionality theories often 
advance relativist theories of (in)justice. The present author is interested in helping to advance 
dialectical approaches to studying (in)justice as alternative to idealist monism, dualism, and pluralism. 
What follows is a proposed conception of injustice.
Alienation as injustice
The approach taken in this article starts from a Marxist-Humanist concept of society (Fuchs, 2020a) 
that stresses human beings’ common characteristics and needs in society. Based on Karl Marx, Georg 
Lukács (1984, 1986) argues that work and social production form the models of human activity in 
society. He speaks in this context of teleological positing, which is a reference to Aristotle’s concept of 
the teleological cause. Aristotle (2002, §1139b) defines the teleological cause the following way: “one 
who makes something always makes it for the sake of something.” In teleological positing, humans 
produce active and consciously to try to attain defined goals. The dialectic of production and 
communication is another core common feature of humans: social production is organized through 
communication and communication is a particular production process, namely the process of the 
production of sociality, social relations, social structures, social systems, institutions, and society.
A truly materialist analysis of society does not assume that there is an economic base and a political 
and cultural superstructure that can be reduced to the base. The materialist analysis of society rather 
stresses that social production is an economic process that operates in all social relations and social 
systems, including politics and culture, and takes on emergent qualities in particular systems. There 
are humans as social producers in the economy, politics, and culture, as well as in all social systems 
organized in these three realms of society. In the economic system, humans produce use-values that 
satisfy human needs. In the political systems, they produce collective decisions and rules that govern 
society’s organization. In culture, they produce meanings and definitions of the world.
A dialectical concept of justice can be based on such a framework of society. It conceives of injustice 
as alienation and justice as humanism. Alienation is the unifying principle of injustice. Humanism is 
the unifying principle of justice. Alienation and humanism take on different forms in society’s various 
spheres. Marx’s notion of alienation is based on the concept of economic alienation but also has 
a more general meaning. Economic alienation is the class relation, where workers do not own the 
means of production and the products they are compelled to produce. David Harvey (2018) argues 
that alienation has a universal character in class societies. The universalization of alienation is the 
extension of alienation beyond economic production, the economy and bounded spaces into realms 
such as circulation, consumption, culture, politics, globalization, the relation of nature/society, etc.
Marx sees alienation besides economic exploitation also as the universal form of injustice, in which 
humans are not in control of the structures that affect their everyday lives (Fuchs, 2020b, chapter 7). 
Under alienated conditions, humans (re)produce social relations in everyday life and are not in control 
of the conditions of these social production processes. Alienation is the “production of the object as 
loss of the object to an alien power, to an alien person” (Marx, 1844b, p. 281). Marx characterizes 
alienation in the following words:
Under alienated conditions, the human being’s “own creation [. . .] [is] an alien power, his wealth [. . .] poverty, 
the essential bond linking him with other men [. . .] an unessential bond, and separation from his fellow men, on 
the other hand, as his true mode of existence, his life as a sacrifice of his life, the realisation of his nature as making 
his life unreal, his production as the production of his nullity, his power over an object as the power of the object 
over him, and he himself, the lord of his creation, as the servant of this creation (Marx, 1844a, p. 217).
Alienation is inhumanity. Alienation implies that humans are robbed of humane living conditions. 
They are denied parts of their humanity. Given that humans are social beings who depend on each 
other and produce and communicate in social relations, they all deserve to lead a good life. The need, 
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wish, and desire for a good life is a common feature of humanity. Alienation is the creation of 
inhumanity and inhuman conditions. Marx and Engels argue that the “conditions of life of the 
proletariat sum up all the conditions of life of society today in their most inhuman form” (Marx & 
Engels, 1845, pp. 36–37). The proletariat “cannot abolish the conditions of its own life without 
abolishing all the inhuman conditions of life of society today which are summed up in its own 
situation” (Marx & Engels, 1845, p. 37). In a class society, there is an “‘inhuman’ way in which the 
oppressed class satisfies its needs” (Marx & Engels, 1845/1846, p. 432).
The argument that ethical foundations of a just society that advances the good life for all as the common 
good are grounded in human nature as social beings can also be found in the communitarian philosophy of 
Charles Taylor and the Aristotelian philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre. Taylor stresses that humans are social 
beings and that advancing justice as the common good follows from this social character: Because “of 
a common good which in fact is sustained by the common life of our society, we ought to accept certain 
principles of distribution which take account of the real balance of mutual indebtedness relative to this good. 
For instance, that we owe each other much more equal distribution than we might otherwise agree to on 
economic criteria, because in fact we are involved in a society of mutual respect, or common deliberation, and 
this is the condition for all of us realizing together an important human potential” (Taylor, 1985, p. 298). 
MacIntyre (1999) argues that humans are dependent, rational, communicative animals who depend on each 
other to survive. “As a practical reasoner, I have to engage in conversation with others, conversation about 
what it would be best for me or them or us to do here and now, or next week, or next year” (110–111). For 
achieving the common good, it does not suffice that humans communicate, they also need to co-operate 
(114). For MacIntyre, the interest to advance the common good for all follows from the social character of 
humans that makes them depend on each other.
Alienation is a gap between the actuality and the potentials of humans and society. They are 
hindered in what they could be, in developing to the full extent enabled by society. There are certain 
parallels between Marx’s notion of alienation and the notion of capability development by Sen and 
Nussbaum. Class societies such as capitalism undermine their own universal promises; there is a
discrepancy between the rhetoric of universal interests and the reality of particular class interests within the limits 
circumscribed by particular systems of production and the boundaries of the concomitant social and political 
institutions and cultural ways of life. The problem can be solved only when the rhetoric/reality discrepancy is 
overcome, that is, when a particular system of production is established which permits the coincidence of the 
universal interests of society with the particular interests of a class, and when the concomitant social and political 
institutions and cultural lifestyles promote and encourage this coincidence. This coincidence results for Marx in 
the self-realization and self-development of all individuals within a society: this outcome has truly become the 
common good (West, 1991, p. 92).
In a humanist society, all humans and society can realize their potentials and lead a life that is adequate 
to humans, a humane life. Power differentials in the economy, politics, and culture that privilege the 
few at the expense of the many have to be overcome for creating a just society. Table 5 presents 
a typology of injustice as alienation.
Alienation is the unifying principle of injustice that takes on specific forms in the economy, the 
political system, and culture: exploitation in the economy, domination in the political system, and 
disrespect and ideology in culture.
For Marx, alienation is a feature of capitalism and at the same time older than capitalism. Particular 
forms of alienation such as war, violence, classes, ideology, or patriarchy are older than capitalism, but 
have in capitalist society been sublated (aufgehoben) in a Hegelian sense: they have been preserved but 
at the same time transformed into phenomena such as imperialism, the capitalist class, commodity 
fetishism, reproductive labor that reproduces wage-labor, etc. Alienation is not limited to the econ-
omy, but connects inequalities across society’s different realms. David Harvey (2018) therefore speaks 
of universal alienation. Alienation is both a condition and a process, a structure and a practice, a state 
and a relation. Alienation In a dialectical process, alienation interconnects the levels of objects and 
human subjects in societies that are shaped by domination.
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The capitalist economy is a system in which workers produce commodities with the help of means 
of production that are the private property of companies. These commodities are sold on commodity 
markets so that profit is achieved and capital can be accumulated. In capitalist society, the logic of 
accumulation also extends into the political and cultural system where we find the accumulation of 
decision-power and influence in the political system and the accumulation of reputation, attention and 
respect in the cultural system. Table 6 gives an overview of injustices in capitalist society. The 
accumulation of capital, influence, and reputation results in the asymmetrical distribution of eco-
nomic, political and cultural power and creates the injustices of exploitation of labor in the capitalist 
economy, domination of citizens in the political system, and disrespect of human individuals and 
groups in the cultural system.
Communication/media injustice
Aristotle stresses that justice has to do with the common good, the common benefit for all. “And the 
proverb ‘the things of friends are common’ is right, since friendship consist in community. All things 
are common to brothers and comrades” (Aristotle, 2002, §1159b). In a just society, all humans are 
friends and are enabled to treat each other as friends. There are joint etymological roots of the words 
“communication,” “community,” and the “commons.” To “communicate” meant originally to make 
something “common to many” (Williams, 1983, p. 72). A true communication society is a society of 
the commons where everyone benefits (Fuchs, 2020a). But communication has just like society taken 
on alienated forms.
For both Nancy Fraser and Iris Marion Young, communication is a cultural phenomenon (see 
Fraser, 1997, pp. 13–14; Young, 1990, pp. 23, 38). They leave open the relationship of communication 
and work. One can clearly see the influence of Habermas on Fraser’s and Young’s approaches. 
Habermas separates work and interaction, which resulted in his dualism of system and lifeworld 




alienation Definition The alienated The alienators
Economy exploitation Exploitation is a process where one economic group is 
capable of and controls means for forcing another 
economic group to produce goods that are transferred to 
the dominant class so that it owns and controls these 
resources.
exploited class exploiters, 
exploiting 
class
Politics domination One group in society benefits at the expense of others, who 
are excluded and marginalized. The dominative group 
has means at its disposal to defend its privileged position 
and to keep others disadvantaged. Domination operates 
through a variety of processes and structures, including 










When they are disrespected, humans are denied humanity, 
visibility, attention, recognition through ideology, unity 
without diversity (imperialism of cultural 
homogenization), diversity without unity (cultural 
relativism, imperialism of cultural difference), cultural 
asymmetries of voice/visibility/recognition, etc. Ideology 
is a means and process through which one group 
portrays society or certain aspects of it (such as certain 
groups or individuals) in a false or distorted manner in 
order to legitimate and uphold its power and interests. 
Disrespect is practiced through ideology, by denying 
other human beings’ relevance, or by denying the 
cultural commons, i.e. common aspects of human life.
the disrespected ideologues, 
demagogues, 
influencers
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(Fuchs, 2020a). The basic problem of this dualism is that communication is not limited to a specific 
realm of society but is together with production constitutive of all social relations. Production is 
communicative just like communication is a specific production process. The dialectic of commu-
nication and production shapes all realms of society. Communication is therefore not limited to 
culture.
As a particular type of production and teleological positing that (re)produces sociality and social 
relations, communication is an inherent feature of social relations of humans in society. Alienation 
therefore always has a communicative dimension. Table 7 provides an overview of communication’s 
roles in alienation. In class relations, humans are compelled to act and communicate to produce goods 
that are owned by the ruling class. In alienated politics, humans are excluded from influential political 
communication that makes a political difference (exclusion), or their voices are marginalized (margin-
alization), or their communication and information is monitored (surveillance), or their minds and 
bodies, including their communication, are absolutely silenced through genocide, murder, war, etc. 
(violence). In alienated culture, there are asymmetries of reputation, which means that culturally 
marginalized individuals and groups might be able to speak, but they are not heard, or they are hardly 
or seldomly heard, or what they say and do is through ideologies presented in distorted ways in the 
public so that their reputation is harmed and what they think, say, and do is perceived in false ways.
Communication is the process where two or more humans interact symbolically to make meaning of 
each other and the world. Media are means of communication, means that mediate, i.e. enable and support, 
communication. Communication is a human practice. Media are mediating structures. There are media 
wherever there is interaction of moments. For example, the blood system and the brain are mediating 
systems of the body. In society, media are means of communication. Wherever humans communicate, 
there is some form of mediation. Wherever there are media in society, there are human information and 
communication processes. There is a dialectic of communication and the media. In alienated societies, 
media and communication tend to take on alienated forms. Just like communication is an aspect of 
Table 6. Alienation as injustice in capitalist society.
Sphere
General 










capital VS. labor Capitalist exploitation: capital’s private 
ownership of the means of production, 
capital, and created products implies the 











Domination: citizens’ lack of influence on 













Invisibility, disrespect: lack of recognition as 
consequence of an asymmetric attention 
economy
Table 7. The communicative dimension of different forms of injustice.
Type of injustice Communicative dimension
Economic alienation: exploitation class communication: communication in class relations that organize exploitation
Political alienation: domination exclusion from political communication
Cultural alienation: disrespect, 
ideology
invisibility of voice: 
what certain individuals and groups say and do is presented in distorted manners or is 
marginalized
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alienation, alienation is also an aspect of communication. In alienated societies, there is a dialectic of 
alienation and communication. There is communicative alienation and alienated communication. Table 8 
provides an overview of the dimensions of alienated communication and alienated media.
In the communication and media economy, alienation is the exploitation of communication 
workers and private control of means of communication so that others are excluded from owning 
and using these means of production. In communication and media politics, alienation is the 
exclusion of certain groups’ and individuals’ voices from influential political communication and 
the existence of dictatorial decision-making processes in media organizations. In communication and 
media culture, alienation is the production and dissemination of ideology via means of communica-
tion and the production and reproduction of asymmetries of attention and visibility. There is an 
asymmetric attention economy.
Capitalism, racism, and patriarchy are three modes of power relations that each combine economic 
alienation, political alienation, and cultural alienation. Capitalism, racism, and patriarchy involve 
specific forms of exploitation, domination, and ideology. The three forms of alienation are interacting 
in particular forms of power relations. Capitalism, racism, and patriarchy/gender-related oppression 
are inherently connected and interacting. The economy plays a particular role in this interaction 
because these power relations are relations of production and accumulation of power. Table 9 provides 
an overview of the interactions of capitalism, racism, and patriarchy.
The capitalist economy creates forms of highly exploited, insecure, precarious labor, including 
racialized labor, unpaid labor, reproductive labor, and gender-defined labor, in order to maximize 
profits. Racism and patriarchy have economic, political, and ideological dimensions. In capitalism, 
these dimensions are united by the logic of accumulation. Class, racism, and gender oppression/ 
patriarchy are the three main forms of power relations that advance alienation, deny humans their 
humanity, and create damaged lives. The interaction of class, racism, and gender oppression matters in 
the context of communication and media injustices. Any intersection of these power systems has 
communicative features and shapes communication(s) in societies structured by exploitation and 
Table 8. Forms of alienated communication and alienated media/means of communications.
Dimension 
of injustice Alienated communication




exploitation of communication workers; humans 
are economically disabled from or limited in 
producing, disseminating, or consuming 
information




exclusion of humans and their voices from 
political communication that influences 
political decisions




the production and dissemination of ideology and 
the (re)production of asymmetries of attention 
and visibility of communication
ideological means of 
communication that advance 
malrecognition
Table 9. The interaction of class, racism, gender oppression.
Class Racism Gender-related oppression, patriarchy
Class exploitation racist exploitation gender-structured exploitation
Racism racist 
exploitation
racism discrimination of racialized individuals or 







discrimination of racialized individuals or 
groups of a particular gender
gender-based discrimination
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domination. For example, the intersection of capitalism and racism in the context of communication 
and the media takes on the form of the super-exploitation of communication workers (e.g. call center 
agents) of color and immigrant communication workers, who are forced to work for lower wages than 
others and are the first to be fired.
Digital injustice
Digital communication and digital media are particular forms of communication and the media. 
A central feature of digital technologies is that the computer and digitalization enable the convergence 
of information-, communication- and production-technologies. The computer is not just a digital 
communication medium, but also a digital machine, i.e. an instrument of work and a technology of co- 
operation. The networked computer enables the prosumption of information, where consumers and 
users are enabled to produce user-generated content.
Table 10 gives an overview of three forms of alienation in digital society – i.e., of forms of digital injustice.
Digital exploitation and digital destructive forces constitute economic forms of digital alienation. 
Digital capital’s exploitation of digital labor plays an important role in economic digital alienation. But 
digital production can also have negative and destructive effects on nature and the health of human 
beings. In such cases, the digital productive forces become digital destructive forces. In the realm of 
digital politics, alienation takes on the form of digital domination: digital technologies are used as 
means of dictatorship, surveillance, exclusion, control, war, and violence. In digital culture, alienation 
is digital ideology and digital disrespect: ideologies such as online nationalism or online racism are 
spread via digital networks; humans are disrespected in Internet communication, for example by 
asymmetries of online voice, attention and visibility; there are ideologies about the Internet (such as 
digital techno-determinism, digital techno-optimism, digital techno-pessimism).
Conclusion
In theorizing justice, dialectical theories of justice are alternatives to idealist monism, dualism, and 
pluralism. The approach outlined here is a contribution to dialectical concepts of justice, communication 
justice, media justice, and digital justice. It utilizes the theoretical approach of Marxist Humanism. 
Marxist Humanism argues that there is an essence of human beings – i.e., common features such as social 
production and the dialectic of communication and production. Table 9 Alienation is a key concept of 
Table 10. Types of digital alienation.
Dimension 
of Society









digital capital/digital labor Exploitation of digital workers such as Foxconn 
assemblers or Uber’s platform workers; the 
monopoly power of Google, Facebook, Apple, 
Amazon, Microsoft, etc.; the destructive 
effects of digital technologies on nature and 






digital dictators/digital citizens Donald Trump’s use of Twitter and other social 
media; dictatorial regime’s digital 






digital ideologues & influencers/digital human 
beings: asymmetrical attention economy, 
ideology on and about the Internet
popular culture on social media: the cultural 
power of online-influencers such as 
PewDiePie (> 100 million followers on 
YouTube); the communication of racist and 
nationalist ideology on the Internet
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Marxist Humanism. Using this approach, injustice can be characterized as alienation. Alienation is the 
common aspect of injustice. Alienation destroys the realization of the potentials of humans and society. It 
creates power asymmetries and a gap between potentiality and actuality in society.
Injustice as alienation takes on economic, political, and cultural forms in society in unjust, alienated 
societies in general and in communication processes, media organizations/systems, and in the context 
of digital technologies that are part of alienated societies. Alienation creates inhumanity. It denies 
human beings their humanity by limiting their human capacities and the realization of society’s 
potentials. To overcome alienation, social struggles for a just society and just societal conditions are 
needed. Progressive social movements are the practical dimension and expression of struggles for 
justice and protests against injustices. Protest movements utilize means of communication for protest 
Table 11. Dimensions of a humanist society.




socialism self-managed economic organizations where the means of production are collectively 











human beings and groups are welcomed and their interests, identities, worldviews and 
lifestyles are recognized, there is unity in diversity of identities, worldviews, interests, 
and lifestyles.
Table 12. Forms of humanist and just communication/media.
Dimension 
of justice Humanist, just communication Humanist, just media/means of communication
Economic 
justice
socialist communication: worker self-management of 
communication companies; enablement of humans to 
produce, disseminate, and consume information;
socialist media: collective ownership of the means of 
communication (public service media, citizen media); 




democratic communication: participation of humans in 
political communication so that their voices are heard 
and make a collective difference




respectful communication: the production and 
dissemination of respect and an inclusive culture that 
enables everyone to be visible in the public sphere; 
unity in diversity of voices; education in how to argue 
in complex and intelligent ways and make one’s 
critical voice heard; respectful, complex, controversial, 
critical debate and constructive disagreement
media of recognition: friendly and inclusive means of 
communication that make humans’ interests and 
voices heard and respected by others
Table 13. Forms of humanist and just communication/media.
Realm of 
society Type of humanist, digital justice Meaning of humanist, digital justice
Economy digital socialism: network access for everyone, community is in control of technology, 
digital resources as common goods, green computing/ICTs
Politics digital democracy: participation and 
democracy in decision-making
Ddgital technologies support participatory and deliberative democracy 
and inclusive political communication in the public sphere
Culture digital recognition digital media/communication support making the voices of all heard, 
recognition of all; the unity of diversity of identities, lifestyles and 
worldviews; education in obtaining digital skills that help practicing 
unity in diversity socialism, and democracy
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organization and public mobilization. Table 10 And there are also movements for communicative 
justice that make political demands to change the conditions of communication in society while trying 
to advance democratic, humanist communication and democratic, humanist means of communica-
tion. Humanism is the negation of the negation of alienation. Humanist communication and means of 
communication are the negation of the negation of alienated communication(s).Table 11 provides an 
overview of the humanist organization of society’s various realms.
Table 12 provides an overview of forms of communication and media justice.
Humanist, just communication is socialist media/communication in the economy, democratic 
media/communication in politics, and respectful communication and media that are a source of the 
recognition of everyone. Humanist, just communication stands in an antagonism to class-based, 
exploitative media/communication, dictatorial media/communication, and ideological media/com-
munication that advance misrecognition and asymmetries of voice.
Table 13 provides an overview of just digital communication(s).
Contemporary societies are capitalist societies. Capitalism signifies the negativity of accumulation: 
the existence of injustices. Communicative and digital capitalism are unjust societies with large power 
asymmetries. The alternative is a just, humanist communicative and digital society of the commons, 
where communication’s original meaning as making something common is realized so that all humans 
benefit. Attaining a true communication society requires first and foremost praxis, i.e. social struggles 
against the injustices of alienation, namely exploitation, domination, ideology/disrespect/misrecogni-
tion. For Marxist Humanism, justice, communication justice, media justice, and digital justice are not 
abstract ideas. Ethics and justice are only material and humanist if it they not limited to the realm of 
concepts and interpretation, but take on the form of praxis in social movements. Communication 
justice has to be part of broader struggles for a democratic society of the commons, a participatory 
democracy.
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